Proceedings of the 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2021

COVID-19: Privacy and Confidentiality Issues with Contact Tracing Apps
Leslie Shane C. Ramos
University of Hawaii Maui College
leslier7@hawaii.edu

Debasis Bhattacharya
University of Hawaii Maui College
debasisb@hawaii.edu

Abstract
Contact tracing has been a main topic of
conversation in the COVID-19 pandemic. While
implementation of app-based contact tracing can be
beneficial, it raises concerns of privacy and
confidentiality. To better understand how these issues
were addressed, a qualitative study was conducted
which analyzes the current status of contact tracing
apps from Iceland, Italy, Germany, India, Singapore,
Japan, and four states within the United States. The
comparisons made amongst the contact tracing apps
will be surveyed across numerous criteria. The results
show contact tracing apps are able to assist in the
COVID-19 caseloads by determining self-isolation
periods. Future developments can change these apps
into a tool for returning to normalcy that may require
more user information disclosure, but limited
protections of privacy and confidentiality issues have
not been addressed at a worldwide level.

1. Introduction
Contact tracing is a non-pharmaceutical method of
controlling infectious diseases through means of
seeking and testing contacts of infected individuals
[1]. This method, having origins as far back as
sixteenth century Europe, has been effective for
addressing localized disease outbreaks [2]. The typical
process of contact tracing involves a workforce made
of community health care workers or volunteers who
begin with interviewing the infected person (index
case) for diagnosis, gaining knowledge of their
actions, and identifying other individuals who are at
risk of infection through close proximity [3]. At-risk
individuals are then notified of their exposure to the
disease and given further instructions, which may
include discussing possible symptoms and directions
to self-quarantine [4]. A follow-up is conducted to
investigate changes in condition, aside from
notification of release for self-monitoring or
quarantine [4].
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Klikenberg et al. [5] explains two types of tracing
forms occur: single-step tracing and iterative tracing.
Single-step tracing happens once all identified close
contacts of a symptomatic index case are quarantined
and tracing resumes only when an unknown infected
case is identified during the quarantine period. The
more common form of contact tracing is an iterative
form, where each infected individual from an index
case is considered a new index case and their identified
close contacts become quarantined. While both forms
are concluded to be equal in effectiveness, “capacity
issues may reduce the effectiveness of iterative tracing
if effort is directed towards secondary contactees prior
to primary contactees” [5].

1.1 Advantages of Conventional Contact
Tracing
Contact tracing is by no means a perfect or single
solution to breaking the chain of infectious disease
transmission, as it works in combination with a testing
regimen and quarantine [3]. Before contract tracing
commences, testing could occur for “cases of
endogenous infection (cases of infection caused by
transmission from individuals in the population) or for
cases of exogenous infection (e.g. among immigrants,
visitors from other countries, and travelers returning
from vacation)” [1]. Armbruster & Brandeau noted
that the benefits of contact tracing and testing together
outweigh the benefits of performing them separately
as cost-effectiveness varies on the amount of testing
conducted and vice versa [1]. A result of sufficient
testing contributes to knowledge of individuals who
need to self-isolate and who is unaffected. In order to
deem testing measures as adequate, positivity rates
(the inverse number of positive tests per case) are set
as benchmarks [6].
The process of contact tracing is advantageous for
“targeting of control, at the cost of effort spent on
finding at-risk individuals” [7]. Tracing efforts can
consist of random checking or contact tracing, to
identify infected individuals [8]. Random checking is
usually associated with public health surveillance
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programs, much like the WHO’s Sentinel Surveillance
Program, whose purpose of to obtain high-quality data
for a certain disease, which is unobtainable through a
passive system [9]. The final step of completing
preventative plans is to self-isolate which may seem
simplistic, but it is dependent on the individual’s
safety, comfort, and adequate resources to do so.

overemphasized positivity rate [6]. Currently in May
2020, WHO advised governments that positivity rate
should be 10% or less for adequate testing guidelines
and should remain at 5% or lower for two weeks prior
to reopening [15].

1.2 Disadvantages of Conventional Contact
Tracing

Hawaii has one of the lowest COVID-19 caseloads
in the US with 1 death per 100,000 people and as of
July 10, 2020 there has been 19 deaths [16]. The state
has established a 14-day self-quarantine for arrivals to
assist in keeping numbers at bay [17]. Besides contact
tracing and testing, the Hawaii Department of Health
uses a Sentinel Surveillance Program that will evaluate
disease movements by collecting nasal swab samples
from patients who meet certain criteria and performing
random tests in an attempt to locate unnoticed viral
transmission [18]. Since the beginning of the program,
it has discovered 28 cases of COVID-19 amid 1,876
specimens (1.6%) from a dated week 22 report [19].

Although a stable infrastructure and application is
vital, there is a possibility for missed potential
exposures. A significant reason is contributed to
inaccurate memory recollection and false, incomplete
or missing documentation [10]. Conventional contact
tracing is limited to who the index case is able to
identify, as most people don’t have constant
situational awareness or contact information for every
person encountered. Along with incomplete or missing
documentation, the margin of error has since grown
through the reluctancy of disclosing personal
information due to concerns of stigma, privacy,
government surveillance, and scams. An occasional
obstacle for contact tracing is the inability to interview
individuals who are too sick to participate, in which
case proxy interviews are allowed but jeopardizes
patient confidentiality [11][12].

2. Contact Tracing for COVID-19
To highlight the importance of contact tracing, it is
at the forefront of combating the present-day COVID19 illness as there is no vaccine or effective treatments,
as of July 2020. The workforce in many areas are
inadequately staffed to deal with the magnitude of this
caseload [13]. At a lower estimate of nine COVID-19
incidences daily, the CDC recommends that states
should have 30 contact tracers for every 100,000
residents [12]. Depending on the resources available
and severity of caseload, states are handling the matter
through different means such as “recruiting
volunteers, deploying the National Guard, hiring or
reassigning of government employees, contracting
with outside vendors, and utilizing technology” [13].
In the event workforce scalability is met,
conventional means of contact tracing are laborious.
Given the time between onset of symptoms ranging
from 2-14 days following viral exposure, further
supports the need for faster identification of an index
case’s close contacts as well as testing [14]. Scarcity
in testing at the beginning of the outbreak in the USA
in February-March 2020, allowed only those who met
certain conditions to be tested, leading to an over

2.1 Contact Tracing in Hawaii

2.2 Contact Tracing in Mainland US
On July 10, 2020 the highest amount of COVID-19
cases were occurring in New York, California, Texas,
Florida, and New Jersey [20]. A month prior to this
news, only three of the 50 states have committed to
using the Apple & Google API: Alabama, North
Dakota, and South Carolina [21]. Many states aren’t
using apps for contact tracing but instead looking to
expand their workforce for conventional contact
tracing. States who have deployed app-assisted contact
tracing have had low usage. For example: Utah’s
Healthy Together app was only downloaded by 1.4%
of state’s residents in late May, 2020 [22].

2.3 Contact Tracing Outside the US
Based on Oxford’s COVID-19 Government
Response Tracker, contact tracing outside the United
states has become more comprehensive in comparison
to the limited tracing in the US [23]. Many countries
have resorted to using app-based technology to assist
in decreasing COVID-19 prevalence and have had a
higher adoption rate. One of the first countries to use
Bluetooth technology in contact tracing was Singapore
when news reported in April that “one in five people
have downloaded the app” [24].

3. Technological Implementation
Whilst contact tracing apps don’t compensate for
deficiency of personal protective equipment, quicker
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testing, and the absence of effective treatment,
technological implementation offers effective
outbreak management and affordability. Contact
Tracing apps can be based on centralized or
decentralized models, which has various trade-offs on
privacy and security vulnerabilities [25]. The
processing of both models is initiated in the same way:
when users install the app on their smartphones and
activate Bluetooth or Location Services, their apps
will generate unique private keys [26]. Once in close
contact, which the CDC has defined to be 6 feet and
duration of roughly 15 minutes, the apps will exchange
and record the anonymized keys [12].
A decentralized model, preferred by Apple and
Google, will store that information locally on the
devices and with user permission test results can be
uploaded only to notify other app users [26]. Thus, this
API and apps allows more control over personal
information by storing it on the phone, and offers a
higher degree of privacy [25]. In the centralized
model, the app will report that information to a central
server controlled by a designated entity [25].
Even with technological implementation, some
proximity communication protocols may have
drawbacks, such that “physical interactions obtained
by Bluetooth aren’t a complete picture of the
interaction history, it does represent a large portion of
interactions” [8]. The benefits of contact tracing app
usage results in accelerating the step of identifying
close contacts of an index case, reducing the
probability of viral spread to at-risk individuals. Apps
will be inefficient in isolation, so participation and a
high adoption rate is needed. Researchers at Oxford
University in the UK conducted a study that found if
60% of a country’s population or region used an app it
could prevent a virus from spreading, adding a positive
outlook for lower amounts of app users with an
estimation that one infection can be avoided for every
one to two users [27].

4. Methodology
The overall objective of this analysis is to
understand concerns and issues that occur due to the
implementation of technology in contact tracing
through apps. The initial process consisted of forming
a sample of contact tracing apps from diverse
continental locations: US, Europe, and Asia. Further
review was required to identify similarities and
differences in app characteristics.
In order to discover a range of concerns and issues,
the contact tracing apps were selected based on
differing characteristics and available documentation.
The unit of analysis was the contact tracing apps of

each country. To analyze confidentiality and privacy,
the following categories were established:
voluntary/mandatory use, age requirement, retention
period, deletion ability/period, local storage, central
storage, adoption rate, protocol of app, personal
information disclosure, data controller, and the ability
for user to be identified due to usage.
An examination of contact tracing apps reveals that
a majority are available on both Apple and Google
stores with the ability to run on iOS and Android
phones. Secondary steps performed a qualitative
analysis on privacy policies, FAQs, the contact tracing
apps, and other available documentation. To ensure
reliability and validity of data, information was
collected from available documentation on official
websites, Apple store download pages, and actual use
of selected apps. These contact tracing apps are subject
to change.

5. Contact Tracing Apps in Europe
Table 1: Analysis of European apps.
CRITERIA
Age
Requirement
(Years)
Data
Controller
Immediate
Deletion
Retention
Period (Days)
Amt of Info
Needed For
Registration
Local Storage
Central
Storage
Voluntary Use
Allow For
Identification?
Protocol

Iceland

EUROPEAN APPS
Italy
Germany

4+*

18†

16†

Healthcare

Healthcare

Healthcare

YES‡

YES‡

YES‡

14

14

14-21

1

2

0

Location
records

Random
IDs
Region,
Province
YES

Random
IDs

Phone #
YES

0
YES

NO

NO

NO

Location

AGEN
Bluetooth

AGEN
Bluetooth

*Apple Store age rating
†Parental consent needed for younger ages.
‡Deletion dependent on retention period.
§Changes to use since introduction. [28]–[31].
Here, the term data controller is defined as an
entity “who decides why and how personal data will
be processed” which is much more prevalent outside
the United States (see Table 1) [32]. European
countries declare data controllers as compliance to the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [32]. The
contact tracing apps selected in the Europe are offered
for voluntary use and have explicit healthcare entities
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as data controllers: Italy- Ministry of Health, Iceland Department of Civil Protection and Emergency
Management, Germany – Robert Koch Institute, an
independent public health institute [28]–[30]. All apps
are only available for use within their respective
countries. Although some processes have a small
difference, these countries protect user data under the
GDPR and none store any information that allow for
identification of individuals and their devices [32].

5.1. Iceland
Of the three European apps, Iceland’s Rakning C19 app does not provide an official age requirement.
The Apple Store displays an age rating of 4 years old
and above, which is defined as having "no
objectionable material” [33]. Rakning C-19 requires
the input of a user’s phone number which becomes
stored into the app’s database and triggers an SMS text
message from the country’s health authority. The entry
of the 6-digit code from the SMS text message into the
app signifies the user’s agreement to terms. Rakning
C-19 uses location data, which is encrypted and stored
locally for 14 days. A user may choose to delete the
app from their phones at any time which will disable
and remove location data.
When an individual receives a positive test result
for infection, the Department of Civil Protection and
Emergency Management’s Contact Tracing Team will
use the app to send a request for access of location
data. An app user agrees to disclosure by selecting the
button on the screen and (if applicable) entering their
Icelandic national ID number for verification
purposes. Location data is forwarded to the Contact
Tracing Team’s database upon verification and stored
in their database for 14 days after upload. Phone
numbers that were entered for acceptance of terms will
be deleted when after contact tracing is no longer
required. Iceland’s adoption rate of the app is about
40% of their population [28].

5.2. Italy
Whereas Italy’s Immuni app states that users must
be at least 18 years old, requiring parental or guardian
consent is needed for users between 14-18 years of
age. Initial app configuration requires the user to select
the region and providence of residency. The app uses
Apple and Google’s Exposure Notification API
allowing Bluetooth communication with other app
users. It doesn’t collect any geolocation data,
including GPS. When someone tests positive for
COVID-19, a healthcare professional will enter the
date of symptom onset or swab test (if the user is
asymptomatic) into the Italian Ministry of Health’s

system. If the individual is an Immuni app user, they
are able to access the one-time password (OTP)
generation function from the app and provide the 10digit OTP code to the healthcare operator for upload
authorization, which prevents any false reports. After
receiving confirmation from healthcare operator, the
user is able to upload their random codes to the server
to notify others of exposure.
Immuni will store the following encrypted
information locally: providence of residency,
indicators of the App’s operation status, temporary
codes, receipt of exposure notification, date of last risk
contact, Temporary Exposure Key (TEK), previous
contact risk indicators, OTP code, and date of
symptom onset or swab test. Data retention may vary
depending on the type of information. However, all
data is subject to deletion on 12/31/2020. In addition
to the GDPR, the data is also processed in accordance
with Articles of the Italian Personal Data Protection
Code [29]. Despite the June 2020 introduction of
limited app availability in four regions, it has garnered
8 million downloads out of Italy’s 60 million
population [34].

5.3. Germany
Similar to Italy, Germany’s Corona-Warn-app
requires legal guardian agreement for users below the
age of 16 years and uses the same Apple and Google
Exposure Notification with Bluetooth communication.
However, it does not need any personal information.
The app functionality allows for two ways to report a
verified, positive test result. One of the methods works
in the same way as Italy’s Immuni app,
communication with a healthcare operator provides
the app user with a TeleTAN (Tele Transaction
Number) and entry of TeleTAN will request the
upload of diagnosis keys. Another method involves
the optional scanning of a custom-QR code received at
the testing facility, that becomes hashed and matched
with the user’s test results.
The app’s test retrieval functionality offers the
option to share the results once available. Data
deletion may vary for certain features, such as 14 days
for exposure logging, 21 days for test registrationpositive results, 14 days for test result sharing and 21
days for TeleTANS and TANS stored on server.
Currently, the app is available for European countries
listed in their documentation. Pending availability for
other countries will occur after proper legal
compliance is ensured [30].
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6.1. India

6. Contact Tracing Apps in Asia
Table 2: Analysis of Asian contact tracing apps.
India

ASIAN APPS
Japan

Singapore

4*

4+*

13+*

Gov

Healthcare

Healthcare

NO‡

YES

NO

45-60

14

25

6

0

3-4

Local Storage

Location
Records &
unique ID

Random IDs

Random IDs

Central
Storage

8 pieces of
information

0

Voluntary Use
Allows For
Identification?

NO§

YES

Phone
Number,
Personal
Info, User ID
YES§

YES

NO

YES

Bluetooth,
GPS

AGEN
Bluetooth

Bluetrace,
Bluetooth

CRITERIA
Age
Requirement
(Years)
Data
Controller
Immediate
Deletion
Retention
Period (Days)
Amt of Info
Needed For
Registration

Protocol

*Apple Store age rating
†Parental consent needed for younger ages.
‡Deletion dependent on retention period.
§Changes to use since introduction. [31], [35]–[37].
As seen in Table 2, The Ministry of Health for both
Japan and Singapore are listed as data controllers for
their voluntary apps, which operate with Bluetooth for
proximity communication [37][36]. Local storage for
both apps consists of randomized Bluetooth IDs. In
contrast, India has opted for the Government to
oversee the information for their country’s mandatory
app that operates proximity communication
combination of Bluetooth and GPS [35].
Close contact for all three apps is considered to be
within the Bluetooth range: 6 feet for India, 1 meter
for Japan, and 2 meters for Singapore [35]–[37]. Age
requirements for usage are not specified in the
available documentation. Japan and India are assumed
to follow the Apple’s age rating of 4 years and above
that deems they have no objectionable material [33].
Singapore’s TraceTogether displays an age rating of
13 and above. Of these three, only Japan’s COCOA
app excludes any identification of an individual or
device.

In comparison to other apps in the analysis, India’s
Aarogya Setu app has a comprehensive list and
retention period for information. Registration
information requires a user’s name, phone number,
age, gender, profession, and travel history in the last
30 days, which will be retained for the entirety of the
account’s existence. Once registered, a unique digital
ID (DiD) becomes assigned to the user and location
details are captured. All registration information, DiD,
and location details will be stored on app’s server.
Data retention periods differ on health status.
Uploaded information for healthy individuals will be
purged from the server after 45 days. Recovered
individuals will have their information removed from
the server after 60 days. Bluetooth and GPS are to be
enabled at all times. Local data storage contains time,
proximity, location, duration, and digital signature of
interaction between users. Other locally stored data
includes a location record that captures user location
at 30 or 15 minutes, depending on the epidemic’s
severity, which is only uploaded to the server with the
DiD if the user tests positive for infection.
When an individual is positive for infection, the
testing lab discloses results to the Indian Council of
Medical Research (ICMR). ICMR shares the list of
infected individuals to the app’s server, eliciting
updates to a user’s status. The risk of infection is
calculated for other app users and notifies them of
exposure, which can be displayed on their home screen
in four classifications: green, yellow, orange, and red
[35]. Due to mandatory nature of this app, the adoption
rate has been affected.

6.2 Singapore
TraceTogether documentation states that in order
to complete app registration, the user will need a valid
National Registration Identity Card (NRIC), Foreign
Identification Number (FIN), or valid document of
current stay in Singapore, a compatible phone, and
disclosure of mobile phone number [38]. Further
examination of the app reveals that a user is provided
with six profile options: NRIC, FIN-Work Pass, FINDependent’s Pass, FIN-Student’s Pass, FIN-Long
Term Visit Pass (LTVP), and “I’m Visiting
Singapore.” All profile options involve entry of name
in addition to previously noted information.
Specifically, the NRIC profile involves sharing date of
birth. The latter option, “I’m Visiting Singapore”, will
also require entry of date of birth, nationality, and
passport number. User’s mobile number, random
anonymized user ID, and identification details are
stored in a secure server prohibiting any public access.
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Local storage data consisting of anonymized
Bluetooth data is retained for up to 25 days. No GPS
location, Wi-Fi, or mobile network data is collected.
Instead of the Apple and Google Exposure
Notification used by other apps, TraceTogether uses
the BlueTrace protocol resulting in more reported
phone encounters for Android users as less than a
quarter of phone encounters are made with iOS-to-iOS
phones. Users may request for deletion of
identification data through email only if they have not
been infected. The process will remove mobile
number, identification details, and user ID from the
server.
If an individual receives a positive test result, they
can expect contact from a healthcare official by phone.
Only the Ministry of Health has the ability to “decrypt
the shared encounter history to obtain and use
personally-identifiable information to filter for close
contacts and contact potentially infected users”, which
is made possible with the mobile numbers used for app
registration [39]. There is no need for users to upload
any information. The app plans to be in service until
the need for contact tracing ceases. No specific laws
are mentioned to protect user data. However the
BlueTrace protocol, made by their Government
Technology Agency, declares implementation of
privacy safeguards [36]. As of July 5, 2020, 2.1
million people have downloaded the app [40].

6.3. Japan
App registration for COCOA includes agreement
to terms of use, enabling of contact detection, and
confirmation of proximity communication function
(Bluetooth). Encrypted, locally stored data is
comprised of contact codes, changed every 10
minutes, and daily keys, changed every 24 hours. Data
deletion transpires automatically after 14 days.
Alternatively, users have the ability to delete records
for the previous two weeks by stopping app usage and
deleting the app [37]. Japan’s Ministry of Health has
used technology made by Apple and Google for this
familiar exposure notification process [31].
When a user tests positive for infection, the
healthcare organization will record the test result into
“The Health Real-time Information-sharing System on
COVID-19” and provide a temporary, randomlyissued processing number via phone number or email
that allows an individual to voluntarily register their
test results in the app. Close contact app users within
the past two weeks will receive an alert [37]. Japan’s
COCOA app received more than 4 million downloads
in its first week of launching announced by news
reports in late June 2020 [41].

7. Contact Tracing Apps in US
Unlike Europe, the United States has no national
privacy law similar to that of the GDPR, which affect
much of the criteria for the apps (see Table 3)[42]. US
contact tracing apps have a wide range of differences
among them and aren’t currently operable at a national
level. The following apps were selected for analysis:
CARE-19, Healthy Together, NOVID, and Pathcheck
(former known as SafePaths). Contact Tracing Apps
would assist in the manual process for the United
States, but a structured framework and protections
need to be arranged for inter-state operability.
Table 3: Analysis of US contact tracing apps.
CRITERIA
Age
Requirement
(Years)
Data
Controller
Immediate
Deletion
Retention
Period (Days)
Amt of Info
Needed For
Registration

CARE19

UNITED STATES
Healthy
NOVID
Together

Path
check

18*

18†

4+*

16*†

Developer

Developer

Developer

Developer

YES

YES

YES

YES

14

30-60

NA

14

2

3

0

0

Random
IDs

Location
records

0

0

Location
Data

Location &
Random
IDs
6 types of
information

YES

YES

YES

YES

Allow For
Identification?

NO

YES

NO

NO

Protocol

Location

Bluetooth,
GPS

Ultrasound,
Bluetooth

AGEN
Bluetooth,
GPS

Local Storage
Central
Storage
Voluntary
Use

Location
records

*Apple Store age rating
†Parental consent needed for younger ages.
‡Deletion dependent on retention period.
§Changes to use since introduction. [31], [43]–[46].
Those marked as having no objectionable material
with an age rating of 4+ in the Apple Store are NOVID
and Pathcheck, amid Pathcheck stating in their App
Privacy Policy that children under 16 aren’t allowed to
use service [46][45]. Consequently, not requiring any
personal information for registration and storing
unidentifiable information locally. On the other hand,
CARE-19 and Healthy Together have explicit age
requirements, both labeled for use by individuals 18
years and older [44][43]. Healthy Together allows an
exception for those between the ages of 13 and 17 on
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the condition there is parental review and agreement
to terms of service [44].
The processing of data is at the discretion of the
developer or other 3rd parties mentioned in the
documentation. Due to either of these not classified as
a healthcare provider or other covered entity, HIPAA
laws do not apply [44]. CARE19 states compliance
with California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) yet is
not available for use in California [43]. CCPA allows
consumers the control what information the company
has of the individual and provides the ability to request
deletion [47]. An inference could be made that the
developer is attempting to prove responsible data
handling or a 3rd party site for data processing is
located in California. All data collected from apps
allow deletion at any time through uninstallment or
email request. Though all, except NOVID, are subject
to retention periods noted in Privacy Policies. The
various technologies are used to collect information
such as location; GPS, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, and
IP address; Bluetooth and Ultrasound; and Bluetooth,
respectively [43]–[46]. NOVID is currently the only
app within this analysis using ultrasound technology,
which acquires obtain more accurate proximity
measurements [48].

8. Comparative Analysis
The age criteria as shown in the first row of each of
the above Tables 1, 2 and 3, many of the contact
tracing apps either allow for underage usage with
parental or guardian consent or display a low age
rating in the Apple Store. While COVID-19 does not
affect an individual of a lower age group as much as
those ages 65 years and older, any preventative
measures to contain the spread will be beneficial as
schools return to in-person learning operations and
common travel routines resume [49]. Overall, the apps
have considered underage usage for minors.
When comparing data controllers, the European
and Asian apps display healthcare authorities in charge
of the information received, with an exception of India
whose government is listed as the data controller. Due
to this, the assumption can be made that there is a level
of trust with the app user and the listed entity to
responsibly process the data collected. Compared to
the United States, the title of data controllers is not
explicitly mentioned in the app documentation. Data
processing for the apps is handled at the discretion of
the app developer.
Unsurprisingly, all apps from the United States are
voluntary and allow for immediate deletion of
information upon uninstallment or email request.
While other countries provide the option for deletion,

some information either acquired at registration or
upon server upload may be retained as stated in their
documentation. The standard retention period for apps
using technology from Apple and Google, listed with
protocols of “AGEN”, is 14 days. Additional retention
of data can be caused by test registration, as well as the
sharing and outcome of test results. Contact tracing
apps that retain information for longer periods, have
more information stored whether it be centrally or
locally.
Apps that were initially voluntary in early 2020 are
now looking to create exceptions for people who are
visiting from other countries. Singapore’s
TraceTogether app was deemed voluntary, but news in
June of 2020 reports that the Ministry of Manpower
required foreign workers to have app installed
[40][50]. Based on this information, the two
expectations can be made that usage for contact
tracing apps may be required to permit entry into other
countries and to resume normal activities such as work
and schooling. In contrast, India’s contact tracing app
has always been mandatory. As of May 20, 2020,
individuals under 14 years old in India are not
mandated to use the app [51]. This change in
requirement shows user concerns over mandates that
may cause privacy issues, especially for children.
The obvious connection exists that the amount of
personal information needed for initial registration
increases the likelihood of being able to personally
identify a person or device. In the same way, data
controllers are looking to learn more from the
information with the core intention to perform
conventional contact tracing as a more comprehensive
approach. Complementarily, apps who require no
information for registration purposes are assuming
that app usage will mainly allow an individual to
determine when it is necessary to self-isolate, which
may influence a higher amount participation from
users to self-report test results for others to do the
same.
Apps labeled as “AGEN Bluetooth” have Apple
and Google Exposure Notification implemented into
the app. As a result, those apps will not have
mandatory usage and adopt a decentralized model
[24]. Whereas apps, whose protocols are made without
the use of Apple Google technology, have an
opportunity to change protocols if the need arises.
Overall, the prevalence of contact tracing apps has
spurred innovation amongst various countries. This is
an evolving issue with Covid-19 and hopefully will
lead to better contact tracing apps and methodologies
during the near decade.
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9. Privacy and Confidentiality Issues and
Concerns

ranks just as high with the amount of CCTVs within
the country [56].

One of the main concerns with contact tracing apps
is privacy, which can be defined as “the claim of
individuals, groups and institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others” [52]. Some
apps have addressed the issue by allowing voluntary
use, storing of personal information locally, choosing
a decentralized model, requiring no personal
information, and providing immediate deletion of
information. Correspondingly, the issue of
confidentiality defined as “the respectful handling of
information disclosed within relationships of trust,
especially as regards to further disclosure”, was
addressed by allowing for users to self-report test
results, encrypting personal information obtained,
periodical generation of new randomized keys, and
prohibiting public access [11].
While laws and policies exist for public health
information handling in the United States, such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), none are robust to address the potential for
data abuse with the use of contact tracing apps. To
tackle the issue, on June 1, 2020 US Senators
Cantwell, Cassidy, and Klobuchar have introduced the
Exposure Notification Privacy Act, a bipartisan bill,
that sets federal rules to ensure that data collected by
contact tracing apps would not be used for commercial
purposes [53]. The bill discusses: “voluntary
participation, user consent, right to data deletion at any
time, diagnoses verification, strict restrictions on data
use, and strong enforcement provisions” [53].
Likewise in spite of India’s Personal Data Protection
bill, an epidemic is considered grounds for processing
personal data without consent and holds no mention in
the documentation of how it plans to regulate
children’s personal data [54].
Individuals may be skeptical to use technology that
allows for interactions or locations to be recorded due
to a fear of government surveillance or data abuse. In
the US, the Fourth Amendment, known to “protect
individuals against reasonable search and seizure by
the government”, does not apply to electronic searches
[42]. Until the previously mentioned Exposure
Notification Privacy Act is passed, Americans are
lacking privacy from government surveillance when
using contact tracing apps [53]. Whilst countries
within the European Union/European Economic Area
are covered by the GDPR, others are plagued with the
same issue. India is rampant with government
surveillance being that the nation’s surveillance
program launched in 2013 [55][54] and Singapore

10. Conclusion
It is apparent that these apps were made with the
intention to combat the current pandemic caseload by
determining self-isolation periods and a means for
individuals to assist in decreasing infectious spread.
Despite reopening phases barely within reach for most
countries, changes can be made to have contact tracing
apps as a tool for returning to normalcy. However,
international or interstate usage of these apps has not
been addressed due to varying levels of governmental
trust and laws concerning data processing and
protection. For globalization and re-opening purposes,
contact tracing apps should consider how to best
ensure protection, privacy and confidentiality for user
data on a worldwide level.
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